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SIXTH AMENDMENT-CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MULTIPLE
REPRESENTATION OF CODEFENDENTS
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980)
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court last term issued the third
opinion in the Court's history on the question of
multiple representation of criminal codefendants
and the sixth amendment right to "assistance of
counsel."' In Cuyler v. Sullivan,2 the Court an-
nounced three major interpretations of this sixth
amendment guarantee. First, it held that the same
constitutional rights accrue to defendants who hire
private counsel as accrue to defendants for whom
the court appoints a public defender.3 Second, the
Court held that absent objection at trial, a trial
judge need only initiate an inquiry into the ques-
tion of conflict of interest if he "knows or reasona-
bly should know that a particular conflict exists.",
4
Finally, the Court held that, in order to establish
a sixth amendment violation, a defendant who
raised no objection at trial must show that an
actual conflict of interests adversely affected his
lawyer's performance.
5
The Supreme Court's rulings in Cuyler represent
a major step toward consistentjudicial enforcement
of the constitutional right to counsel. However, the
Court's refusal to impose an affirmative duty of
inquiry on trial judges in every case perpetuates
the injustice that currently arises when a convicted
defendant cannot prove from the face of the record
that a conflict of interest hindered his lawyer's
performance. An affirmative duty of inquiry would
alleviate this difficult problem with little added
burden on the trial courts.
II. BACKGROUND
In an important 1942 decision, Glasser v. United
States,0 the Supreme Court ruled that by requiring
I U.S. CONsT. amend. VI reads in part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." In McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970), the Court
recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the
effective assistance of counsel." In Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Court held that the fourteenth
amendment makes this protection applicable to the
states.
2 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980).3 Id. at 1716.
4 Id. at 1717.5 Id. at 1718.
6 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
an attorney to represent two codefendants with
conflicting interests, a court denied one of the
defendants his sixth amendment right to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel. The Court did not again
address the relationship between multiple represen-
tation and the sixth amendment until 1978 when
it issued a narrow ruling in Holloway v. Arkansas7
that trial judges, when faced with timely objections
to multiple representation, must either appoint
separate counsel or take adequate steps to ascertain
whether the risk of a conflict of interests is too
remote to warrant separate counsel
In ruling that a trial judge infringed upon the
sixth amendment rights of a defendant by appoint-
ingjoint counsel for codefendants with conflicting
interests, the Glasser Court relied upon two impor-
tant factors in the record that revealed a conflict.
First, the Court found that in the interest of pro-
tecting one codefendant, the shared attorney had
declined to cross-examine a government witness
whose testimony linked another codefendant to the
crime.9 Second, the Court found that the lawyer
had failed to object to the admission of arguably
inadmissible evidence, a decision that worked to
the detriment of one codefendant and to the benefit
of the others.'"
Glasser thus required reviewing courts to search
trial records to decide whether one attorney rep-
resenting codefendants violated their rights to ef-
fective assistance of counsel. Resulting caselaw, in
both state and federal courts, was wildly discor-
dant." Reviewing courts split over the necessity of
7 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).8 ld. at 484.
9315 U.S. at 73.
10 Id. at 73-74. The Court found evidence in the trial
record "indicative of [joint counsel's] ... struggle to serve
two masters .... Id. at 75. It held that "the 'assistance of
counsel' guaranteed by the sixth amendment contem-
plates that such assistance be untrammeled and unim-
paired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall
simultaneously represent conflicting interests." Id. at 70.
11 Comprehensive accounts of the divergence among
lower courts after Glasser and before Holloway are pre-
sented in several scholarly articles. See, e.g., Note, Criminal
Codefendants and the Sixth Amendment: The Case for Separate
Counsel, 58 GEo. LJ. 369 (1969); Comment, Conflict of
Interests in Multiple Representation of Criminal Co-Defendants,
68J. CRIM. L. & C. 226 (1977).
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finding prejudice before granting relief.' 2 Most
jurisdictions required only a showing that counsel
furthered the cause of one codefendant at the
expense of another, without inquiring into the
effect of such actions on the outcome of the trial.
1 3
As to conflicts of interest, some courts read Glasser
to require that a defendant claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel show an actual conflict ex-
isted, 4 while other courts only required showings
that a conflict was "substantially possible," 1s "pos-
sible," ' 6 "imminently possible," '
7 or "potential." 
18
The Supreme Court clarified some of the con-
fusion when it reexamined this area of the law in
Holloway. There, a public defender appointed to
represent three codefendants at a single trial moved
for severance and for appointment of separate
counsel, alleging the possibility of a conflict of
interests. The trial judge held a hearing, which the
Supreme Court later found inadequate, and he
rejected both claims of the public defender.1
9
s2 Despite strong language in Glasser that no finding of
prejudice need be made, other language in the opinion
confuses the issue. The Court affirmed Kretske's convic-
tion saying, "we are clear from the record that no preju-
dice is disclosed as to him." Id. at 77.
is See State v. Hunt, 26 Md. App. 417, 338 A.2d 95
(1975); People v. Hilton, 26 Mich. App. 274, 182 N.W.2d
29 (1970); Booth v. State, 491 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. 1973);
State v. Canery, 144 N.J. Super. 527, 366 A.2d 706 (App.
Div. 1976); State v. Tapia, 75 N.M. 757, 411 P.2d 234
(1966); People v. Byrne, 17 N.Y.2d 209, 217 N.E.2d 23,
270 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1966); State v. Goode, 84 S.D. 369,
171 N.W.2d 733 (1969).
A few courts have held that reversal of a conviction is
automatic if a conflict existed, even when no specific
harm to the defendant can be demonstrated in the record.
See United States v. Gougis, 374 F.2d 758, 761 (7th Cir.
1967); People v. Frey, 50 Ill. App. 3d 437, 442, 365
N.E.2d 283, 287 (1977); Commonwealth ex rel. Whitling
v. Russell, 406 Pa. 45, 48, 176 A.2d 641, 643 (1962).
These courts focused on the language in Glasser that
emphasized the fundamental nature of the right to coun-
sel. See note 12 supra.
14 See, e.g., United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671, 677
(7th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049
(1976) (defendant must show with a "reasonable degree
of specificity" that a conflict existed); Foxworth v. Wain-
wright, 516 F.2d 1072, 1077 n.7 (5th Cir. 1975) (defend-
ant must show an actual significant conflict).
'5 See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela, 521 F.2d 414,
416 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976).
16 See, e.g., Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897
(9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 839 (1967).
17 See Brown v. State, 10 Md. App. 215, 221, 269 A.2d
96, 100 (1970).
i8 See, e.g., People v. Gallardo, 269 Cal. App. 2d 86, 90,
74 Cal. Rptr. 572, 575 (1969).
19 The court rejected both of the public defender's
claims, that confidential information limited his ability
to lead direct examination and that conflicting interests
Relying on Glasser, Holloway noted that joint
representation is not a per se violation of the sixth
amendment 2 and that a defendant may waive the
right to effective counsel.21 On the central issue in
the case, the Court held that a trial judge has a
duty, when confronted by any claim of conflict of
interests, either to appoint separate counsel or to
take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk of
conflict is too remote to warrant separate counsel.
It also held that the failure to discharge this re-
sponsibility mandates automatic reversal on ap-.
peal.2 Justice Powell, joined by Justices Blackmun
and Rehnquist, dissented, expressing his concern
precluded him from protecting the interests of the other
two defendants:
MR. HALL: I am in a position now where I am
more or less muzzled as to any cross-
examination.
THE COURT: You have no right to cross-examine
your own witness.
MR. HALL: If one [defendant] takes the stand,
somebody needs to protect the other
two's interest..., and I can't do that
since I have talked to each one indi-
vidually.
I can't even put them on direct ex-
amination...,.
THE COURT: You can just put them on the stand
and ... tell the man to go ahead and
relate what he wants to.
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 479-80.
20 The Court cited Glasser for the principle that, "joint
representation, is not per se violative of constitutional
guarantees of effective assistance of counsel.... [I]n some
cases, certain advantages might accrue from joint repre-
sentation." Id. at 482.
2s The Court also relied on Glasser for the proposition
that a defendant may waive his right to the effective
assistance of counsel. Id. at 483 n.5.
22 The Court quoted Glasser and reasoned:
In the normal case where a harmless-error rule is
applied, the error occurs at trial and its scope is
readily identifiable.... But in a case of joint repre-
sentation of conflicting interests the evil ... is in
what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain
from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible
pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing
process.... [E]ven with a record of the sentencing
hearing available it would be difficult to judge
intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attor-
ney's representation of a client. And to assess the
impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney's
options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations
would be virtually impossible.... lAin inquiry into
a claim of harmless error here would require ...




that "the Court's opinion contains seeds of a per se
rule of separate representation merely upon the
demand of defense counsel...."2
After 36 years of silence, the Supreme Court
selected the very narrow facts of Holloway as the
forum in which to reexamine the relationship be-
tween multiple representation and effective assist-
ance of counsel. As with Glasser, the Court focused
narrowly on the timely pretrial objections made by
defense counsel. Both cases left several of the most
troublesome multiple representation issues unre-
solved. In Holloway, the Court expressly reserved
two such issues: the scope of the trial court's duty
to assure that defendants are not deprived of their
sixth amendment right to the effective assistance
of counsel, and the standard on appeal for showing
conflict of interest before a court will find a viola-
tion of the right.?'
III. CUYLER V. SULLIVAN
The Supreme Court reached the multiple rep-
resentation question for the third time in Cuyler v.
Sullivan.2sJohn Sullivan, the respondent, first raised
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel caused
by a conflict of interest, on appeal, thereby pre-
senting the Court with questions of first impres-
sion.s2
Sullivan was indicted along with two codefen-
dants for first degree murder.17 Two privately re-
tained lawyers represented all three defendants in
separate trials in the Pennsylvania state court.28
The evidence against Sullivan, who was tried first,
was entirely circumstantial. At the close of the
Commonwealth's case, the defense rested without
2 Id. at 491 (Powell, J., dissenting). The requirement
of appointment of separate counsel or a hearing upon
timely objection could very easily be construed as a per
se rule, due to the difficulty of holding a meaningful
inquiry without violating an attorney's ethical demands
of confidentiality.
2
4 Id. at 483-84. Since Glosser, appellate courts have
differed on how strong a showing of conflict must be
made, and on how certain the reviewing court must be
that the alleged conflict existed, before they will find a
violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Courts
also differed with respect to the scope and nature of the
affirmative duty of the trial judge to assure that defend-
ants are not deprived of their right to effective assistance
of counsel. See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
These questions were not answered in Holloway.
25 100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980).
26Id. at 1713-14.
27Id. at 1712.
28 Sullivan initially had different counsel at the medi-
cal examiner's inquest, but thereafter accepted multiple
representation because he could not afford to pay his
own lawyer. Id
presenting any evidence of its own.29 The jury
returned a guilty verdict.30 Sullivan's posttrial mo-
tions failed, and on direct appeal, the Pennsylvania




Sullivan then petitioned for collateral relief.
32
He claimed that his appellate counsel had not
assisted him adequately before the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and that a conflict of interest had
prevented his trial lawyer from representing him
effectively in the lower court. ' The Court of Com-
mon Pleas permitted Sullivan to take a second
direct appeal on the basis of his first claim. Al-
though it declined to pass directly on the conflict
of interest question, the Court did find that trial
counsel fully advised Sullivan about his decision
not to testify.34
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court again af-
firmed Sullivan's conviction and denied collateral
29Id. The prosecution's case was very weak. On appeal,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court divided evenly on
whether the commonwealth's evidence was sufficient to
support a conviction. See United States ex rl. Sullivan v.
Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 100 S. Ct.
1708 (1980).
"o 100 S. Ct. at 1712. Sullivan's codefendants were
acquitted in separate trials. Id. at 1713.
9' Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 446 Pa. 419, 286 A.2d
898 (1971).
32 100 S. Ct. at 1713. Pennsylvania Post Conviction
Hearing Act, 19 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1180-1 et seq. (Purdon
1965) (since repealed and now implemented by PA. R.
CRIM. P. 1501-06).
33 100 S. Ct. at 1713.
"Id at 1713.
In five days of hearings, the Court of Common Pleas
heard evidence from Sullivan, [one codefend-
ant],... Sullivan's lawyers, and the judge who pre-
sided at Sullivan's trial. [The two lawyers] ... had
different recollections of their roles at the trial[s]
.... DiBona [one lawyer] testified that he and
Peruto [the other lawyer] had been "associate coun-
sel" at each trial. Peruto recalled that he had been
chief counsel for [both of Sullivan's codefendants]
... , but that he merely had assisted DiBona in
Sullivan's trial. DiBona and Peruto also gave con-
flicting accounts of the decision to rest Sullivan's
defense. DiBona said he had encouraged Sullivan
to testify .... Peruto remembered that he [wanted
to rest the defense] ... because "I though [sic] we
would only be exposing the [defense] witnesses for
the other two trials...." Sullivan testified that he
had [accepted] ... his lawyer's decision [to rest]
... the defense. But other testimony suggested that
Sullivan preferred not to [testify for fear of] ... dis-
clos[ing] an extramarital affair. Finally, one code-
fendant claimed he would have appeared at Sulli-
van's trial to rebut [the evidence presented by the
prosecution] ....
100 S. Ct. at 1713 (citations omitted).
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relief, finding no basis for Sullivan's claim of inef-
fective counsel at trial. 35 It found that Peruto, one
of Sullivan's attorneys, merely assisted the other,
DiBona, at Sullivan's trial while DiBona assisted
Peruto at the trials of the other codefendants. On
these facts, the court concluded that there was no
dual representation. 36 The court also said that
resting the defense without presenting any evidence
was a reasonable tactic in light of the weakness of
the case against Sullivan.
3 7
Having exhausted his state remedies, Sullivan
sought habeas corpus relief, but the federal district
court denied his petition.38 The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed, 9 holding that par-
ticipation of co-counsel in the three trials estab-
lished as a matter of law that both lawyers repre-
sented all three defendants.4 0 The court ruled that
any showing of a possible conflict of interest or
prejudice, however remote, warranted reversal. 4' It
found a sufficient showing of possible conflict in
Peruto's admission that concern for the codefen-
dants had affected his judgment concerning Sulli-
van's defense.42 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, 43 and vacated and remanded
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
44
On the first major sixth amendment issue in the
case, 45 the Court rejected the state's argument that
ss Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 446 Pa. 419, 286 A.2d
898 (1971), aff'd on rehearing, 472 Pa. 129, 371 A.2d 468
(1977), rev'd, 593 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 100 S.
Ct. 1708 (1980).
36472 Pa. at 161, 371 A.2d at 483.37 1d. at 162, 371 A.2d at 483-84.
's See United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d
512 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1713 (1980).
The district court accepted the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's conclusion that there had been no multiple rep-
resentation. The court also found that the evidence ad-
duced in the postconviction hearing revealed no conflict
of interest.
9 Id.
40id. at 518-19.41 Id. at 522.
42/d.
41 Sullivan v. Cuyler, 444 U.S. 823 (1979), vacated, 100
S. Ct. 1708 (1980).
44 100 S. Ct. at 1714.
4 5 The Supreme Court first ruled on two preliminary
issues, not directly germane to sixth amendment law. The
Court found that the court of appeals had not exceeded
its proper scope of review when it rejected the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court's conclusion that no multiple rep-
resentation had taken place. Id. at 1714-15. The Habeas
Corpus Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1966), provides that
"a determination after a hearing on the merits of a
factual issue... shall be presumed to be correct" (certain
exceptions enumerated). The Court found that the state
court's holding did not fall within this statute because it
defendants who retain their own lawyers are enti-
tled to less protection than defendants who receive
state-appointed counsel. It held that:
The vital guarantee of the Sixth Amendment would
stand for little if the often uninformed decision to
retain a particular lawyer could reduce or forfeit the
defendant's entitlement to constitutional protection
... [therefore] we see no basis for drawing a distinc-
tion between retained and appointed counsel that
would deny equal justice to defendants who must
choose their own lawyers.1
6
Thus, the Court, in perhaps the clearest ruling in
Cuyler, refused to distinguish the use of retained
multiple counsel from the existing line of caselaw,
Glasser and Holloway, which developed for court-
appointed multiple counsel.47 This ruling cleared the
way for the Court to reach the two issues, expressly
reserved in Holloway,45 concerning objections to
multiple representation first raised on appeal.
On the issue of the degree of a trial court's duty,
the Court held that, absent any objection from the
defense, the judge need not initiate an inquiry into
conflict of interest unless he "knows or reasonably
should know that a particular conflict exists."
'4 9
The Court acknowledged Holloway's requirement
was a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. Id.
at 1714.
The Court also rejected the state's contention that
failings of privately retained counsel did not constitute
the state action requisite to habeas corpus relief. Id. at
1715. The Court held that, "when a state obtains a
criminal conviction [from a defendant who was denied
effective assistance of counsel] it is the state that uncon-
stitutionally deprives the defendant of his liberty." Id.
46 100 S. Ct. at 1716 (footnotes omitted). The Court
cited with approval an earlier Third Circuit opinion
which refused to distinguish the two situations. Id. at
1716 n.9 (quoting United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport,
478 F.2d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 1973)):
A rule which would apply one fourteenth amend-
ment test to assigned counsel and another to re-
tained counsel would produce the anomaly that the
nonindigent, who must retain an attorney...,
would be entitled to less protection ... The effect
upon the defendant-confinement as a result of an
unfair state trial-is the same whether the inade-
quate attorney was assigned or retained.
ITSee text accompanying notes 69-79 infra.
' Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 483-84.
49 100 S. Ct. at 1717. In choosing this rule, the Court
followed the lead of the Fifth Circuit. Compare United
States v. Medel, 592 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1979) ("the mere
'act that the codefendants were tried together does not
trigger a duty of inquiry on the part of the trial court.")
with Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir.
1975) (The trial judge has an obligation.., to anticipate
conflicts reasonably foreseeable at the outset of the case).
[Vol. 71
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
that trial judges must at least investigate timely
objections to multiple representation, but it noted
that the Court never has held the sixth amendment
to require trial courts to initiate inquiries into the
propriety of every occurrence of multiple represen-
tation.s° The Court reasoned that since defense
attorneys have an ethical obligation to avoid con-
flicting representations and also to advise the court
promptly when a conflict arises, trial courts may
rely on their good faith and good judgment."'
However, rather than giving complete control over
the propriety of multiple representation to defense
counsel, 2 the Court imposed the safeguard of a
duty of inquiry if a trial judge knows or reasonably
should know of a conflict.53 In the Cuyler situation,
several factors led the Court to conclude that noth-
ing in the circumstances of the case mandated an
inquiry into the possibility of conflict. These in-
cluded the provision for separate trials for the three
codefendants, the opening arguments outlining a
defense theory that none of the codefendants was
connected with the murders, the opening argu-
ments that indicated a willingness to call witnesses
whose testimony was needed, and the tactical rea-
sonableness of resting Sullivan's defense in response
to the weak case presented by the prosecution.5
The Cuyler Court also held that "[i]n order to
establish a violation of the sixth amendment, a
defendant who raised no objection at trial must
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest ad-
versely affected his lawyer's performance."15 How-
ever, once a defendant "shows that a conflict of
interest actually affected the adequacy of his rep-
resentation [he] need not demonstrate prejudice in
order to obtain relief.5 The Court refused to extend
the "possibility of conflict" concept of Holloway to
objections raised for the first time on appeal.5 7 It
reasoned that a possibility of conflict is present in
almost every instance of multiple representation,
and that if on appeal a defendant need only show
possibility to raise the presumption of ineffective
assistance, all multiple representation would be
0 100 S. Ct. at 1717.
51 Id.
52 Much has been written on the inadequate control
resulting from complete attorney discretion in this con-
text. See, e.g., Hyman, Joint Representation of Multiple De-
fendants in a Criminal Trial: The Court's Headache, 5 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 315, 325-26 (1977); LowenthalJoint Representa-
lion in Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal, 64 VA. L. REv.
939,941 (1978).
100 S. Ct. at 1717.




precluded.5s Until a defendant shows that his law-
yer "actively represented conflicting interests,"5 9 he
has not established the constitutional predicate for
his sixth amendment claim.
Because the Third Circuit had applied a liberal
"any possibility of conflict, however remote" stan-
dards° in reversing Sullivan's conviction, the Su-
preme Court vacated the judgment and remanded
the appeal for reconsideration consistent with its
61opinion.
Although he concurred in the result, Justice
Brennan would place an affirmative duty upon the
trial judge to inquire concerning conflicts of inter-
est.6 2 Thus, in Cuyler, where no evidence indicated
that Sullivan knew of his rights and consciously
waived them, he would give Sullivan a presump-
tion that his representation had in fact suffered,63
and remand the case to allow the state an oppor-
tunity to rebut this presumption.64
Justice Marshall dissented, agreeing with Justice
Brennan that trial courts have a duty to inquire
whether there is multiple representation, to warn
defendants of the possible dangers of such repre-
sentation, and to ascertain that the multiple rep-
resentation results from the defendant's informed
choice.6 He construed the Court of Appeal's deci-
sion to have been impliedly based upon a finding
of actual conflict of interest,6 and would affirm
the judgment of that court.6
SId at 1718.
59d. at 1719.
60 Before Cuyler, the Third Circuit applied the most
liberal test of all the circuits, requiring only a showing of
the slightest possibility that a conflict of interest existed
at trial before holding multiple representation constitu-
tionally defective. See, e.g., United States ex rel Hart v.
Davenport, 478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973); Walker v.
United States, 422 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1970).
61 100 S. Ct. at 1719.
6Justice Brennan wrote, in part:
Upon the trial judge rests the duty of seeing that
the trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential
rights of the accused. The trial court should protect
the rights of the accused to have the assistance of
counsel.... While an accused may waive the right
to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should
be clearly determined by the trial court [on the
record .... This principle is honored only if the
accused has the active protection of the trial court
in assuring that no potential for divergence in in-
terests threatens the adequacy of counsel's represen-
tation. (citations omitted).
100 S. Ct. at 1719. (Brennan, J.)
6Id. at 1720-21.
rId. at 1721.
6 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
r Id. at 1721 n.2 & accompanying text.
67 Id. at 1721.
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IV. APPOINTED VERSUS RETAINED COUNSEL
In Culer, the Supreme Court finally laid to rest
the notion that different sixth amendment rights
inure to defendants depending on whether they are
represented by retained or appointed counsel.6
After Glasser, many courts have applied the consti-
tutional guarantee of conflict-free (effective) assist-
ance of counsel to cases involving privately retained'
lawyers.69 Others, however, have distinguished the
two situations, withholding postconviction relief
from defendants whose trial counsel had been pri-
vately retained.70 These latter courts have reasoned
that a defendant who retains private counsel is
bound on an agency theory to the actions of the
lawyer he selected.7 1 They also have denied relief
on the grounds that no state action had deprived
such a defendant of his constitutionally protected
rights.7 2 The legal community has levelled harsh
criticism against both theories.
73
68 See note 46 & accompanying text supra.
6 See, e.g., United States v. Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038 (7th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d I (1st Cir.
1972); Larry Buffalo Chief v. South Dakota, 425 F.2d
271 (8th Cir. 1970); Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355
(6th Cir. 1954).70 See, e.g., Dusseldorf v. Teets, 209 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 969; United States ex ret.
Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1953), afld, 351
U.S. 454 (1956). Accord, People v. Stevens, 5 Cal. 2d 92,
53 P.2d 133 (1935); Darby v. State, 79 Ga. 63, 3 S.E. 663
(1887).
71 See, e.g., People v. Stevens, 5 Cal. 2d at 99, 53 P.2d
at 136 ("If there was any error in this regard, it was
merely an error ofjudgment on the part of the defendant
in the selection of counsel.")
72 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203
F.2d at 426.
73 See Polur, Retained Counsel, Assigned Counsel: Why the
Dichotomy?, 55 A.B.A.J. 254, 255 (1969); Waltz, Inadequacy
of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction
Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289, 296-301
(1964).
An extreme but illustrative colloquy, reported in an
article by Professor Lowenthal, points up typical conflict
situations which are present regardless ofwhether counsel
was appointed or retained:
An attorney appeared in a municipal court for'the.
purpose of requesting a reduction of bail for four
defendants jointly charged with possession of a large
cache of drugs seized from a communal house.
Referring to the first of his clients, the lawyer stated:
"This defendant should be released on his own
recognizance, Your Honor, because he has no rap
sheet. Obviously he is not a hardened criminal and
should not be locked up with others who are." When
the second defendant's case was called, counsel
argued: "No drugs were found in this defendant's
bedroom, Your Honor. His chance for an acquittal
is great and consequently it is highly likely that he
will show up for trial." On behalf of the third
One commentator has described the agency ra-
tionale as a "concept gone astray."7' 4 He noted that
the agency theory is essentially a creature of com-
mercial law. The logical underpinnings of a prin-
cipal's liability to an innocent third party for the
acts of the principal's agent vanish when the con-
cept is superimposed on the attorney-client rela-
tionship in criminal cases, because agency doctrine
presupposes a principal in a position of knowledge
to direct and supervise his agent. The same com-
mentator has called the state action theory "my-
opic",7 5 because it fails to focus on the .dfendant'%
perception that inept representation has caused his
conviction. Whether the lawyer was appoihted or
retained is irrelevant to this perception.
The Cuyler Court readily disposed of the state
action basis for distinguishing appointed from re-
tained counsel by finding the requisite state action
in a criminal conviction and sentence imposed by
a state court, a part of the government.7 6 Moreover,
the agency and state action rationales overlook the
language and policy of the sixth amendment. The
Supreme Court has said that the Constitution
guarantees the right to "effective assistance of
counsel., 77 In Glasser and Holloway, the Court said
that effective assistance requires conflict-free coun-
sel.7 8 This right is no less violated when ineffective
representation comes from a privately retained law-
yer than it is when counsel is appointed.
In any event, Cuyler has now ended the dispute.
In refusing to recognize the distinction, the Court
stressed that "[a] proper respect for the sixth
amendment disarms petitioner's contention that
defendants who retain their own lawyers are enti-
tled to less protection than defendants for whom
the State appoints counsel."7 9
defendant, the lawyer began to argue that his client
had lived in the area all of his life. The judge
interrupted the lawyer, asking him if any drugs had
been seized from the bedroom of defendant number
three. The lawyer responded, "No comment, Your
Honor." The judge countered with the remark: "I
suppose that this client also has a prior record,
making him a hardened criminal," evoking the
response that although the defendant has a prior
record, he certainly was not a hardened criminal.
The fourth defendant then interrupted the proceed-
ings by eagerly requesting to be represented by the
public defender.
See Lowenthal, supra note 52 at 941.
74 See Waltz, supra note 73, at 297.
75 d. at 299.
76 100 S. Ct. at 1715.
77 See note 1 supra.
78 See notes 6 & 7 supra.79 See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
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CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
V. THE COURT'S DUTY OF INQUIRY
In Glasser, the Court said that the trial judge has
"the duty of seeing that the trial is conducted with
solicitude for the essential rights of the accused,"
including the right to have the effective assistance
of counsel.as But the requirements of that duty
have eluded the judiciary up to, and perhaps be-
yond, Cuyler. In Cuyler, the Court held that absent
an objection to multiple representation at trial, a
trial court need not inquire as to possible conflicts
of interest unless it "knows or reasonably should
know that a particular conflict exists."8' The
knowledge that multiple representation is occur-
ring, without more, is not sufficient to raise this
duty of inquiry. The Court reasoned that since
defense lawyers have an ethical obligation to avoid
conflicting representations and to advise the court
promptly if a conflict of interests arises, trial courts
may assume either that joint representation entails
no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients know-
ingly accept the risk.5 Thus, according to Cuyler, a
trial judge need only concern himself with the
defendant's right to conflict-free counsel if an ob-
vious "particular conflict" exists on the face of the
multiple representation before him.8
The Court endorsed the idea of voluntary in-
quiry by trial judges when a case of multiple
representation occurs in criminal trials, noting with
express approval that several federal circuits al-
ready were invoking their supervisory powers to
require similar inquiry.' It also cited proposed
8 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. at 71. The Glasser
Court said that the duty was "not to be discharged as a
matter of rote, but with sound and advised
discretion ... and with a caution increasing in degree as
the offenses dealt with increase in gravity." Id. (quoting
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312-13 (1930)).
The duty imposes "serious and weighty responsibility
upon the trial judge .... Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938)).
8' 100 S. Ct. at 1717.
8id.
8 id.
8 Id. at n.10 (citing United States v. Waldman, 579
F.2d 649, 651-52 (1st Cir. 1978)); United States v. De-
Berry, 487 F.2d 448, 452-54 (2d Cir. 1973); United States
v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1075 (1979); United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98
(8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978), and Ford
v. United States, 379 F.2d 123, 125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
In Ford, Judge Skelly Wright held that the trial judge
should always initially appoint separate counsel under its
supervisory powers. Then, if the interests ofjustice and of
the clients would be served by joint representation, coun-
sel can suggest this for the court's consideration. 379 F.2d
at 125-26. If the Supreme Court approves of this exercise
of supervisory powers, perhaps it should require it. With
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c), which
provides that federal district courts "shall promptly
inquire with respect to ... joint representation and
shall personally advise each defendant of his right
to the effective assistance of counsel, including
separate representation. ' ' 5 But the Court explicitly
stopped short of making the 44(c) requirement a
part of the sixth amendment right to counsel. The
Court may have believed that the proposed federal
rule and the ABA Standards for Trial JudgesH
which also require inquiry in every case, could
combine to reach almost the same end. At the same
time, the Court implicitly indicated its willingness
to allow the states some flexibility in developing
their own standards in this area.
In addition, the Cuyler majority evinced a con-
cern that the imposition of a duty of inquiry in
every case would, as a practical matter, bar joint
representation for those defendants who desired it
for strategic or other reasons. Justice Powell, who
wrote the Court's opinion in Cuyler, had expressed
this concern when he dissented in Holloway.8 7 In
Cuyler he especially noted the advantage in cases
where "[a] common defense ... gives strength
against a common attack.' 'ss
such a requirement, appellate review of sixth amendment
conflict of interest challenges would be greatly simplified
and justice would be better served. See text accompanying
notes 94-95, infra.
8 100 S. Ct. at 1717 n.10.
Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44 (c)
-provides:
Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly
charged.., or have been joined for trial..., and
are represented by the same retained or assigned
counsel or by retained or assigned counsel who are
associated in the practice of law, the court shall
promptly inquire with respect to such joint repre-
sentation and shall personally advise each defend-
ant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel,
including separate representation. Unless it appears
that there is good cause to believe no conflict of
interest is likely to arise, the court shall take such
measures as may be appropriate to protect each
defendant's right to counsel.
Pub. L. No. 96-42, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) (Effective
December 1, 1980 or by Act of Congress, whichever is
sooner).
86 The Function of the Trial Judge, ABA PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3.4(b) (Draft, 1972):
"Whenever two or more defendants who have been
jointly charged, or whose cases have been consolidated,
are represented by the same attorney, the trial judge
should inquire into potential conflicts which may jeop-
ardize the right of each defendant to the fidelity of his
counsel."8
7 See note 23 supra.
"8 "[A] reviewing court cannot presume that the pos-
sibility for conflict has resulted in ineffective assistance of
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Courts and commentators have offered two other
arguments in favor of allowing defendants to have
joint representation if they so desire. First, as Jus-
tice Frankfurter noted in his Glasser dissent, joint
representation can provide a "means of insurance
against reciprocal recrimination."8 9 Second, some
courts have construed the sixth amendment to
confer on defendants the right, unfettered by the
courts, to choose their own counsel.9°
The Cuyler duty is not the least intrusive way to
safeguard a defendant's access to multiple repre-
sentation. It inadequately protects the sixth
amendment right to counsel for defendants who
choosejoint representation unaware of the inherent
risks involved. In these cases the court might not
even question multiple representation. Further-
more, the Cuyler duty fails to assure access to sepa-
rate counsel for defendants who would be harmed
by joint representation, but who cannot disclose
the facts underlying the conflict without incrimi-
nating themselves, prejudicing their defense, or
biasing the trial judge.
Proponents of a prophylactic per se rule barring
multiple representation argue that serious limita-
tions on the scope of conflict of interest hearings
negate any chance for a meaningful determination
at a pretrial hearing.9 The information required
at a conflict hearing might encroach upon an
accused's fifth amendment protections against self-
incrimination.92 Ironically, substantive inquiry also
can interfere with the sixth amendment right to
counsel it seeks to protect by impairing defense
strategy or compelling disclosure of confidential
information.
93
Undoubtedly, pretrial conflicts of interest hear-
ings can uncover some percentage of conflicts with-
out infringing on defendants' constitutional rights.
Such hearings may also result in findings that the
chance of conflict is too remote to warrant separate
counsel. In a substantial number of cases, however,
it may not be possible to determine adequately
whether significant possibility of conflict exists. In
counsel. Such a presumption would preclude multiple
representation even in cases where '[a] common
defense... gives strength against a common attack."'
100 S. Ct. at 1718 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. at 92 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
89 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. at 92.
90 See United States v. Liddy, 348 F. Supp. 198 (D.D.C.
1972). See also United States ex rel. Baskerville v. Deegan,
428 F.2d 714, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928
(1970) (right to choose counsel not absolute, nor on a par
with the right to assistance of counsel).
9' See Lowenthal, supra note 43, at 986-88.
92 United States v. Paz-Sierra, 367 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 935 (1967).
'3 See Comment, supra note 10, at 242.
these cases, under the Cuyler duty, courts would be
free to refuse to appoint or order separate counsel.
Perhaps a better approach would be to impose
a duty of inquiry in every case, along with a
presumption against multiple representation when
a pretrial conflict hearing cannot conclusively de-
termine the likelihood of conflict. This approach
would not necessarily preclude defendants who
want joint representation from proposing it to the
court.94 It would, however, insure that every joint
representation of codefendants results from their
conscious choices, under the scrutinizing eye of the
trial judge. This approach arguably is more com-
patible with the Glasser rationale concerning the
trial judge's responsibility for the essential rights of
the accused.95
Although pretrial conflict hearings and separate
attorneys will result in increased costs and delays,
the judicial economy from avoiding frequent and
complex appeals on conflict grounds, as in Cuyler,
may offset these costs entirely. But even if the
added costs at the pretrial stages exceed the savings
on the appellate level, judicial efficiency should
never justify infringements on a constitutional
guarantee so basic as the sixth amendment right to
counsel.
VI. STANDARD ON APPEAL
Holloway required trial courts to appoint separate
counsel any time an accused or his attorney
claimed that a possible conflict of interest existed,
unless the court ascertained that the risk of conflict
is "too remote to warrant separate counsel."o Yet,
two years later, the Court in Cuyler held that on
appeal, a defendant who had raised no objection
to multiple representation at trial, "must establish
that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected
his lawyer's performance," for "the possibility of
conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal convic-
tion."97 The Cuyler Court distinguished between a
pretrial opportunity to show that potential conflicts
impermissibly imperil an accused's right to a fair
trial and a posttrial showing of actual conflict
requisite to reversal of a criminal conviction.
98
9' See, e.g., note 84 supra for the D.C. Circuit rule.
95 Justice Murphy, writing for the majority in Glasser,
suggested that the added responsibility entailed in the
defense of a second accused might sufficiently diminish
counsel's effectiveness to support reversal of a conviction:
"Irrespective of any conflict of interest, the added burden
of representing another party may conceivably impair
counsel's effectiveness." Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. at 75.
96 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 484.




Significant public policy needs support this dis-
tinction. Before or during trial, the alternative to
a multiple representation infected with possible
conflicts of interest is the appointment (or reten-
tion) of individual counsel. After conviction, a
finding of ineffective assistance because of a conflict
results in reversal. The first scenario involves pos-
sible delays in the proceedings and more public
defenders. The second potentially may set free
persons who otherwise would be found guilty. This
distinction surely justifies the different tests laid
down in Holloway and Cuyler.
Permitting defendants to upset convictions on
appeal merely by demonstrating, after the fact,
that a. possibility of conflict existed at trial would
be nothing less than a per se rule against multiple
representation. The Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged that "a possible conflict inheres in almost
every instance of multiple representation. "9 A sys-
tem by which "almost every" conviction obtained
against defendants with multiple representation
could be reversed on appeal is untenable.
Unfortunately, the Cuyler standard also has ma-
jor problems. As Holloway indicated, a rule requir-
ing a defendant to show prejudice would not be
susceptible of intelligent, even-handed application.
The Court noted that the evil in joint representa-
tion of clients with conflicting interests lies in what
the advocate refrains from doing at possible pretrial
plea negotiations, at trial, and in the sentencing
process. These factors do not show up in the record,
and hence are not reviewable by appellate
courts.50 When it made these comments in Hollo-
way, the Court was not addressing the standard for
review on appeal of a Cuyler situation because it
found that the judge had violated the defendant's
sixth amendment rights at trial. Nevertheless, these
ubiquitous problems also plague the efforts of a
reviewing court attempting to determine the exis-
tence of actual conflicts of interest on the basis of
the trial record.1 'O
Trial records do not reflect lost plea bargaining
opportunities that result from joint counsel's desire
to protect codefendants; nor do they reveal the
defense strategies counsel has rejected because of
conflicts. Similarly, when a lawyer elects not to
cross-examine a witness, his reason does not appear
in the record. The lawyer may even cross-examine
with apparent zeal, yet completely omit another
9Id. at 1718.
lo Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 490-91.
101 See Lowenthal, supra note 52, at 978. "[TIrial-court
records normally will mask not only the prejudicial effects
of a conflict but also the very existence of the conflict
itself."
line of questioning disadvantageous to a conflicting
interest. Any attempted appellate review must be
based on sheer speculation as to the thoughts of the
advocate.'
2
Given the choice between a standard on review
under which subtle infractions are left standing
and a standard by which a substantial number of
guilty persons go free, the former, that chosen in
Cuyler, is best. But the dilemma merely points up
the need to circumvent this kind of appellate re-
view of alleged multiple representation infringe-
ments on sixth amendment rights. A pretrial in-
quiry into possible conflicts of interest would avoid
both standards of review. In every case, the judge
will have considered and approved or rejected the
multiple representation before the trial begins.
10 3
This requirement would standardize a procedure
which a substantial number of federal circuits vol-
untarily follow,'14 the ABA recommends, l05 and
the Supreme Court approves.'0
6
VII. CONCLUSION
Cuyler answered many questions about the mul-
tiple representation area upon which state courts
and federal circuits previously had split. After Cuy-
ler, courts cannot consider whether counsel was
appointed or privately retained in determining
how much protection a defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel merits. Cuyler also establishes
that trial judges are not required to ascertain
whether multiple representation presents a conflict
of interests sufficient to warrant appointment of
separate counsel, unless the court knows or reason-
ably should know that a particular conflict exists.
At the same time, the Cuyler Court endorsed vol-
untary inquiry by trial courts. Presumably this
express endorsement will promote the existing
trend among trial judges to make an affirmative
inquiry whenever faced with a multiple represen-
tation situation. To the extent Cuyler advances this
trend, only increased sixth amendment protection
can result. However, in refusing to rule that trial
judges have a constitutional duty to inquire about
multiple representation and possible conflicts of
interest, the Court left the door open for continued
appeals on conflict of interest grounds, which often
are difficult or impossible for a reviewing court to
determine from the record.
SHELL J. BLEIwEIss
'
02 See generally Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 489-
90.
10 See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
i04 100 S. Ct. at 1717 n.10.
i05 Id.
106 Id.
